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INTRODUCTION.
IL may be well to preface my remarks by stating what I do
not intend to talk about, although should I state this in detail I
fear that it would well nigh exhaust the domain of constitutional
law. I would like, however, to make it clear that I have no inten-
tion whatever of treating any one topic of that great subject with
fullness, nor of attempting to digest the cases relating to any partic-
ular subject.
General heads, such as "Due Process of Law," or "Taxation,"
have been treated fully in text books and digests of the
many cases and attempts to systematize and classify them have
been made.
Judge Brannon and Mr. Guthrie. have written excellent works
on those subjects. The Honorable Chief Judge of this State has writ-
ten an exhaustive and interesting monograph on "Due Process of
Law," which, as he is still on the bench, I cannot praise as it de-
serves lest the disinterestedness of my motives be questioned.
*This article was delivered as a lecture before the Dwight Alumni
Association, March ii, r9o4, being one of a series.
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What then is my apology for addressing you at all? Simply
this: That I hope to be able to indicate how radical changes in
the organic law are constantly taking place of which even we law-
yers seem almost unconscious. I may try, in an every day sort of
a way, to philosophize a bit about them; probably I shall propound
opinions which you will partly or wholly dissent from, thus in-
dicating independence of judgment if nothing else. Your dissent
may be some indication, however feeble, that I am wrong, but it
will at least stimulate you to think hard on the topics suggested
and to work out a better and more correct theory. If I seem
therefore, to dogmatize it will be rather for the purpose of setting
other people to thinking of some of the problems suggested than
an attempt to propound anything like a scientific statement of the
actual process of evolution, if I may venture to use that much
abused term, which our fundamental law is undergoing.
Such a course will, I trust, possibly lead to some tangible con-
clusions, perhaps somewhat at variance with the orthodox view,
but I wish to disclaim in foro any attempt at systematic treatment,
and I should prefer to denominate what I shall say to you this even-
ing as a "talk," rather than to dignify it by the more pompous
title of "Lecture."
It is a trite saying that constitutional law is altogether peculiar
to the American system. There is no other country that I know
of in which many questions here considered constitutional and con-
sequently falling within the domain and jurisdiction of courts
are treated as other than political. This idea was happily stated
by the late Lord Chief justice of England, Charles Russell, Earl of
Killowen. He had a rare faculty for going straight to the point-
hitting the nail on the head in terse and exact phrases. He said
in a magazine article entitled: "The Bar as a Profession," as
follows:
"When great political and constitutional questions are being
agitated and are unsolved, these find their way in time into the
legal forum and the world then becomes the richer by the im-
passioned speech of an Erskine or a Brougham, a Curran or an
O'Connell, a Berryer or a Gambetta."
We may interrupt this quotation to suggest that the fact that
these men were great lawyers, was really incidental, for had they
been only laymen they would have had the same opportunities,
although perhaps not the same qualifiation, to discuss consti-
tutional questions, since those questions in England and Francs
have always been treated as purely politicial, being debated and
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decided in parliamentary assemblies, necessarily governed only by
their own views of right and expediency.
To continue the quotation, however:
"But in these islands few of these great questions are unsettled;
and as according to the British Constitution the will of Parliament
is supreme there is but little opportunity in these days for discussing
the constitutional problems which necessarily recur, for example,
in the United States, governed as they are by a written Consti-
tution, where the judicial power is called upon to interpret, and if
necessary to control the acts of legislatures.
"It is largely to this fact that we owe the masterly judgments
of, among others, the great Chief Justice of the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall, and the granite like arguments of Daniel
Webster, perhaps the greatest forensic figure the world has ever
seen."
In treating of constitutional law at all, therefore, we are treat-
ing of subjects which do not usually fall within any domain
except that of pure politics and are in their inherent nature polit-
ical.
Constitutional discussions in Great Britain, such as that con-
cerning the regency of George IV., involving as it did the whole
theory of British sovereignty, take place, of course, in Parliament
and the decision one way or another by a majority vote may serve
as a precedent, but is, of course, in no way binding upon a suc-
ceeding Parliament. The whole British Constitution itself is, with
the exception of a few legislative documents like Magna Charta
and the Bill of Rights, nothing more than a mass of custom, which
is only binding because the mass of the English people have enough
respect for their own history and ancient precedents to hesitate to
depart therefrom, or to modify them only when they feel very
certain that they have become obsolete by lapse of time and change
in manners and customs. The great charters themselves operate
solely on the executive, for Parliament is unfettered and sovereign,
circumscribed only by public opinion.
Justice Bradley in the Slaughter House Cases says:
"The privileges and immunities of Englishmen were established
and secured by long usage and by various acts of Parliament. But
it may be said that the Parliament of England has unlimited
authority, and might repeal the laws which have from time to
time been enacted. Theoretically this is so, but practically it is not.
England has no written constitution, it is true; but it has an un-
written one, resting in the acknowledged, and frequently declared,
privileges of Parliament and the people, to violate which in any
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material respect would produce a revolution in an hour. A viola-
tion of one of the fundamental principles of that constitution in the
Colonies, namely, the principle that recognizes the property of
the people as their own, and which, therefore, regards all taxes
for the support of government as gifts of the people through their
representatives, and regards taxation without representation as
subversive of free government, was the origin of our own revolu-
tion." (16 Wall., p. 115.)
The great English historian, Mr. Lecky, in his delightful book
on "Democracy and Liberty," put it in this way: (Vol. I., p. 139.):
"Many of the most important working elements in the Con-
stitution (the nature of the Cabinet, the functions of the Prime
Minister, the dignity and the attitude of the speakers, the initia-
tive of the Government in matters of finance, the extent to which
the House of Lords may use its veto) rest essentially on the foun-
dation of custom. It is absolutely indispensable to the working
of the whole machine that it should be in the hands of honest
and trustworthy men, of men determined to subordinate on great
occasions their personal and party interests to the interests of
the State; imbued with a genuine spirit of compromise and cor-
dially in harmony with the general spirit of the Constitution. As
long as such a spirit prevails in Parliament and governs the con-
stituencies, so long the British Constitution will prove a success.
If this spirit is no longer found among rulers and Parliaments
and constituencies, there is no Constitution which may be more
easily dislocated and which provides less means of checking ex-
cesses of bad government."
In our great sister Republic of France, founded upon complete
democracy, no such tribunal as our Supreme Court exists. While
there is a written Constitution it can be changed at will by the
National Assembly, that is to say both Houses sitting together,
and the Courts can have no more effect upon it than they could
upon any ordinary statute; nor would they for a moment attempt
to question any law passed by the Chambers as being in conflict
with the Constitution.
It is easy to contrast this system with our own in which the
principles and general essential outlines of government are fixed in
a written Constitution, which in theory cannot be changed save
by amendment, and which amendment must be brought about by
so very large a preponderance of votes.
At first glance our system would seem to indicate a much
greater rigidity than that of the English, but on the other hand the
difficulty of amending it and the historical fact that all the amend-
ments were either virtually synchronous with the establishment of
the Constitution or brought about by four years of war, indicate
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how little change has really been brought about by amendment
under ordinary cirsumstances in the normal constitutional method.
The danger to a governmental system based upon a written
Constitution is, of course, the exact opposite of that incident to a
customary system like the British. Such a written Constitution
may become so rigid that the ever advancing and changing ideas
of new generations, finds no vent or outlet, save by a process
of amendment so difficult as to be almost prohibitive except where
there is a substantial unanimity of opinion, and the Constitution is
either overthrown, as we have seen not infrequently in countries
to the South of us, or it becomes like the Hindoo laws, unchanged
and unchangeable, regarded as sacred and an almost complete
obstruction to any real advance in civilization. The British Par-
liament has passed laws which could certainly not be thought con-
stitutional in the United States.
"The course which was pursued by the British Legislature
towards Irish land was different, and if the terms 'honesty' and
'dishonesty' apply to the acts of Parliaments or Governments as
truly as to individuals, it was distinctly and grossly dishonest.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the greater part of
this legislation, being a direct violation of contract, would have
been beyond the competence of Congress. Nor is there, I believe,
anything in the legislation of the great European countries that is
parallel to it. It has been described by one of the best continen-
tal writers upon government as an attack on the principle of prop-
erty more radical than any measure of the French Revolution, or
even of the Reign of Terror. It is, indeed, much less like ordi-
nary legislation than like extraordinary legislation of the nature
of acts of attainder or confiscation." (Lecky, Democracy and
Liberty, Vol. I, pp. 192-193.)
That we have escaped both of these dangers is largely due to
our Supreme Court. The function of that tribunal as interpre-
ter of the Constitution has become most important, because this
interpretation has kept it, as I hope to indicate, so closely in touch
with modern ideas that our institutions have been gradually modified,
and although they have perhaps ceased to be in accord with the
ideas of the framers, they have become suited to the opinions
of to-day. As Mr. Justice Holmes said, speaking of municipal
law:
"A system of law at any time is the resultant of present needs
and present notions of what is wise and right on the one hand
and on the other of rules handed down from earliest states of
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society and embodying needs and notions which more or less have
passed away." (In the Youth's. Companion.)
Or, as he put it in an earlier work (The Common Law, pp. 35,
36):
"The foregoing history, apart from the purposes for which
it has been given, well illustrates the paradox of form and sub-
stance in the development of law. In form its growth is logical.
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically
from existing precedents. But just as the clavicle in the cat only
tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collar-bone
was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the use they
dnce served is at an end and the reason for them has been for-
gotten. The result of following them must often be failure and
confusion from the merely legical point of view."
"On the other hand, in substance the growth of the law is
legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that what the courts
declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is legis-
lative in its grounds. The very consideration which judges most
rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret robt
from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
consideration of what is expedient for the community concerned.
Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in
fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood
views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our prac-
tice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive prefer-
ences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to
views of public policy in the last analysis. And as the law is
administered by able and experienced men, who know too much
to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism, it will be found that, when
ancient rules maintain themselves in the way that has been and
will be shown in this book, new reasons more fitted to the time
have been found for them, and that they gradually receive a
new content, and at last a new form, from the grounds to which
they have been transplanted.
"But hitherto this process has been largely unconscious. It
is important, on that account, to bring to mind what the actual
course of events has been. If it were only to insist on a more
cbnscious recognition of the legislative function of the courts,
as just explained, it would be useful, as we shall see more clearly
further on.
"What has been said will explain the failure of all theories
which consider the law only from its formal side, whether they
attempt to deduce the corpus from a priori postulates, or fall into
the humbler error of supposing the science of the law to reside in
the legeantia juris, or logical cohesion of part with part. The truth
is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, con-
sistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one
end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other,
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which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become
entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow."
How much truer is this of constitutional law.
I once met an eminent judge of one of our highest courts who
insisted upon speaking of constitutional law as politics. I asked
him why he spoke of it in that way, and his answer was:
"The questions involved are purely political; they deal with
matters about which men's opinions are formed entirely in accord
with their views upon questions as to State and Government, and
the relation between the Government and the individual."
As well try to treat medical questions apart from medical con-
siderations as to treat constitutional law, necessarily involving the
relations of men to government, from any other point of view
than that of political science. What do we mean when we
call Marshall a strong Federalist and Taney a strict Construction-
ist? Simply that they differed as to fundamental uqestions of Govern-
ment.
One may be an excellent judge in an ordinary law court and
know little about the various theories of Government or the his-
tory of this or of other countries, but no man could sit long on the
bench of the Supreme Court without being called upon to decide some
question in regard to which history and political science would be in-
dispensable guides. The voluminous opinions in the recent Insular
Cases deal mainly with questions of American history. A man
who had no views on political questions would be unfit to sit on
the Supreme Bench. I speak, of course, of politics in the broad
sense regardless of the particular matters which partisan politics
are constantly agitating.
As was said by Mr. Justice Harlan a short while ago at a
banquet given in his honor by the members of the Bar of the Supreme
Court:
"The power of the Supreme Court for good as well as for evil
can scarcely be exaggerated. If it cannot actually shape the des-
tiny of our country, it can exert a commanding influence in that
direction. It can by its judgments strengthen our institutions
in the confidence and affection of the people, or more easily than
any other Department it can undermine the foundations of our
governmental system. It can undo the work of the fathers by
abrogating all canons of constitutional construction that have
helped to make this the foremost Nation of the earth. It can, to
use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, explain away the Con-
stitution of our country and leave it a magnificent structure indeed
to look at, but totally unfit for use."
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Mr. Justice Brewer upon the same occasion expressed the
same thought when he said:
"This great tribunal which keeps the forces of State and Nation
alike within their appointed bounds, must depend for its author-
ity upon the respect and confidence of the people. That respect
and confidence of the people must, in my judgment, depend upon
the influence of the legal profession. A court which has their sup-
port will endure; a court without that support will peris-."
The President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, also said
at this banquet:
"For the judges of the Supreme Court of the land must be, not
only great justices, but they must be great constructive statesmen,
and the truth of what I say is illustrated by every study of Amer-
ican statesmanship. For in not one serious study of American
political life, will it be possible to omit the immense part played
by the Supreme Court in the creation, not nerely the inodification
of the great policies through and by means of which the country
has moved on to its present position."
All this seems perhaps somewhat at variance with the general
official theory current among lawyers. We have assumed, without
much reasoning on the subject, that the Court merely interpreted
the Constitution and that every thing that the Court said was
really in the Constitution itself.
Of course this view is most superficial and cannot stand analysis.
If it were true lawyers would have to read only the Constitution
itself and would hot have to examine the hundred and ninety odd
volumes of reports for the purpose of finding out what our con-
stitutional law to-day actually is.
The Constitution itself merely lays down broad general prin-
ciples and it is fortunate that it does so because if it attempted to
go into detail it would have the prolixity of a legal code, and at
the same time it would be much more difficult to adapt it to present
needs by invoking the doctrine, perhaps I should say fiction, of
interpretation.
We have always had two sets of questions constantly coming
up for decision before the Supreme Court. The first set involve
the debatable ground between the sphere allotted to the Federal
Government by the Constitution and that reserved to the States.
The underlying theory of our whole structure was never settled
until the civil war and the consequent amendments which declared
that the Nation and not the States were sovereign. Yet while the
fundamental principle is settled that sovereignty is national and not
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state, there remains many mooted questions as to the powers and limi-
tations of the States, such as those arising under the Interstate
Commerce clause.
The other set of questions are those arising between the indi-
vidual and the state, as Herbert Spencer puts it "The Man v. The
State." They are assuming daily greater prominence because of the
growing pressure of the government on the individual.
We all know that the general tendency of our time is toward
the centralization of power. In the domain of public law this
takes the form of increasing the powers of Government, both State
and Federal, over the liberty of the individual. In private law
this same tendency is marked by the great agglomerations of cap-
ital and the constantly expanding sphere of corporate action in the
domain once covered by individual initiative.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that such a general tendency
exists, not only in America, but throughout the world, and it
necessarily affects in great measure our constitutional law; the
changes in general opinion upon public questions making it nesces-
sary, consciously or unconsciously, for the Court to fall in with
the general procession of ideas. This view is aptly expressed by
Mr. Justice Brown in the case of Holden v. Hardy, (169 U. S.,
366, at pp. 385-6).
"An examination of both these classes of cases under the Four-
teenth Amendment will demonstrate that, in passing upon the
validity of State legislation under that amendment, this court has
not failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent,
a progressive science; that in some of the States methods of pro-
cedure, which at the time the Constitution was adopted were
deemed essential to the protection and safety of the people, or to
the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer neces-
sary; that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the
conduct of individuals, or of classes of individuals, had proved
detrimental to their interests; while upon the other hand, certain
other classes of persons, particularly those engaged in dangerous
or unhealthy employments, have been found to be in need of ad-
ditional protection."
In speaking of the "science of law," the learned Justice evi-
dently does thereby not mean the study and analysis of existing
law, but intends to indicate that the making of law by
Courts is itself progressive and follows the modification of public
opinion.
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THE JURY NO LONGER A FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTION, BUT A MERE
METHOD OF PROCEDURE.
This general tendency by which the Constitution is being con-
stantly brought, as the French say en rapport with existing ideas,
is no where, I believe, so well instanced as in the evolution of jury
trial from a fundamental right into a mere method of procedure.
This proposition which, I believe, can be established by the ex-
amination of the cases on this subject in the Supteme Court of
the United States is:
A right secured to the people by the Constitution in most pos-
itive language, treated by the framers of the Constitution, by the
original State Constitutions, and by the public opinion of the time as a
sacred and fundamental right, has in the course of a hundred
years been relegated to the rank of a mere method of procedure,
as said in Holden v. Hardy, just cited.
This important change has been accomplished without any for-
mal amendment to the Constitution, but wholly under the guise
of judicial interpretation. It has not been brought about on any
theory that the language or intention of the framers of the Con-
stitution was ambiguous, but because the Court considered that
law being a "progressive science," the opinion of to-day, not the
intention of the framers, should fashion constitutional law.
In stating this proposition and in attempting to elucidate it
I do not wish to seem in any way to criticise that great tribunal.
What I believe we should do is to examine quite dispassionately
the process by which our constitutional law is developed and ex-
panded, just as the chemist analyzes the properties of the substance
in his crucible. He does so, or should do so if he hopes to succeed,
without prejudice, passion or preconceived theory, solely with a view
to ascertaining the chemical resultant of his combinations.
As Dr. Johnson says: "Let us rid ourselves of cant;" let us
not do one thing and say another; let us not act upon the theory
that the Constitution is as unchangeable as the law of the Medes
and the Persians, when it is being constantly changed by the
judicial interpretation, quite as effectually and much more easily
than it could be by amendment in the prescribed form.
No where has this been more clearly stated than in the utter-
ances of the Court itself, (Hurtado v. California, xo U. S., 516,
528), in speaking of the opinion in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken, Mr.
Justice Matthews said:
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"The point in the case cited rose in reference to a summary pro-
ceeding, questioned on that account, as not due process of law.
The answer was: however exceptional it may be as tested by
definitions and principles of ordinary procedure, neverthless, this,
in substance, has been immemorially the actual law of the land,
and, therefore, is due process of law. But to hold that such a
characteristic is essential to due process of law, would be to deny
every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of
progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our juris-
prudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes
and Persians."
That the law must change with the development of civilization is
plain; the doubt arises as to how far fundamental institutions should
be modified or abrogated by the Court rather than in the constitu-
tionally prescribed way.
That such a method of virtual amendment by judicial inter-
pretation has been found reflects credit upon the political ability of
our people. Loose thinking, however, has generally been character-
istic of English and American lawyers. While they have gener-
ally possessed sound common sense and enlightened views of jus-
tice, they have proceeded without much concern about legal theory
or careful analysis of what was really taking place in the domain of
legal development. Hence, vast changes have been brought about
in the common law while the Bar was still insisting that the law,
as it was in the time of Henry II. or Edward I., had not suffered
material modification.
Fiction is necessary to progress, so deep rooted is the natural
aversion of man to change. Nor is its utility confined to primitive
law as Sir Henry Maine seems to indicate.
"The successful achievement of innovation without revolution
depends mainly upon an artifice which derives its vitality from
one of the most deep-seated tendencies of the human mind and
which has unquestionably been one of the chief agencies in for-
warding social progress. I refer to the artifice of 'legal fiction' as
shown in the pretense that the novelty of belief or practice just
inaugurated has its warrant in time-honored precedent. * * *
It is this which enables changes to be made 'constitutionally' or in
accordance with a system of ethics framed in an age when the
changes in question could not possibly have been contemplated or
provided for." (Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II., pp. 279-80.)
The origin of the jury was long a much mooted question, but
the researches of the two great historians of the English law seem
to have finally laid the question at rest.
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Messrs. Pollock and Maitland in their epoch making book on
the history of the English law tell us that:
"The English jury has been so highly prized by Englishmen,
so often copied by foreigners, that its origin has been sought in
many different directions. At the present day, however, there can
be little doubt as to the quarter to which we ought to look. We
must look to the Franldsh inquisitio, the prerogative right of the
Frankish kings."
They then explain that the origin of the jury was not really
popular but royal; that the Frankish King or Emperor in traveling
about his domains, summoned together men of the various local-
ities and questioned them as to crimes committed during the pre-
vious year. This institution was more like that of our grand jury
than of our petit jury. Some sort of a slow amalgam between this
and the compurgators or men who swore to the truth of the par-
ties' oaths in a trial, seems to have led ultimately to the modem
institution of the jury.
As the Frankish Empire broke up, the Norman Dukes, model-
ing their smaller domain upon that of the great Empire of Charl-
amagne, retained the inquisitio, but there is an intervening period
during which we know little of the jury. As the same authors
say, speaking of that time:
"Then deep darkness settles down. When it lifts we see
in the new States that have formed themselves no central power
capable of weilding the old prerogative for a long time to come;
the sworn inquest of neighbors will not be an utterly unknown
thing in France; it will only be finally overwhelming by the recep-
tion of the Roman canonical procedure. Even in Germany it will
appear from time to time, yet on the whole we may say that but
for the conquest of England it would have perished and long ago
have become a matter for the antiquary."
"Such is now the prevailing opinion and it has triumphed in
this country over the natural disinclination of Englishmen to admit
that this palladium of our liberties is in its origin not English but
Frankish, not popular but royal."
The petit jury in something like its present form, as well as
the accusing or grand jury, became part of the ordinary mechanism
of justice apparently about the reign of Henry II. (i154-Ii89)
and they both appear, in something like their final form, about
the middle of the twelfth century.
The jury while thus an ancient institution in Europe became
peculiar to England, owing to a long train of historic causes which
I do not now propose to trace. It was regarded as one of the
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most important of our institutions at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and was guaranteed by the Constitution of every
one of the original States. (Hurtado v. California, i1o U. S., p. 557.)
The views entertained of it in this country are well set out by
Mr. justice Field in a charge to a grand jury reported in 2 Saw-
yer, Circuit Court, 667, and quoted with approval by the great
judge, Mr. Justice Miller, in the case of Ex Parte Bain, kpi U.
S., I:
"'The institution of the grand jury,' he says, 'is of very an-
cient origin in the history of England-it goes back many cen-
turies. For a long period its powers were not clearly defined; and
it would seem from the account of commentators on the laws of
that country, that it was at first a body which not only accused, but
which also tried, public offenders. However this may have been
in its origin, it was at the time of the settlement of this country
an informing and accusing tribunal only, without whose previous
action no person charged with a felony could, except in certain
special cases, be put upon his trial. And in the struggles which at
times arose in England between the powers of a king and the
rights of the subject, it often stood as a barrier against persecu-
tion in his name; until, at length, it came to be regarded as an
institution by which the subject was rendered secure against op-
pression from unfounded prosecutions of the crown. In this
country, from the popular character of our institutions, there has
seldom been any contest between the government and the citizen
which required the existence of the grand jury as a protection
against oppressive action of the government. Yet, the institution
was adopted in this country, and is continued from consider-
ations similar to those which give to it its chief value in England,
ind is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons
accused of public offences upon just grounds, but also as a means
of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether
it comes from government, or be prompted by partisan passion
or private enmity. No person shall be required, according to
the fundamental law of the country, except in the cases mentioned,
to answer for any of the higher crimes unless this body, consist-
ing of not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-three good and
lawful men, selected from the body of the district, shall declare,
upon careful deliberation, under the solemnity of an oath, that
there is good reason for his accusation and trial.'" (pp. IO-II.)
That the men who framed the Constitution, as well as the public
opinion of the time, believed jury trial to be a fundamental right and
no mere method of procedure is shown by the following extract from
the great ordinance for the government of the Northwest Terri-
tory, passed by the Congress under the Confederation, and ratified
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by the first Congress under the Constitution. The language used is
as follows:
"And for extending the fundamental principles of civil and
religious liberty which form the basis whereof these Requblics,
their law and institutions are erected- to fix and establish those
principles as the basis of all laws, Constitutions and Governments
which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said Territory,
etc., it is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority afore-
said, that the following articles shall be considered as articles of
compact between the original States and the people and States in
the said Territory and forever remain unalterable, unless by com-
mon consent, to wit:
"ART. i. No person demeaning himself in peaceable and ordi-
nary manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of
worship or religious sentiments in the said Territory.
"ART. 2. The inhabitants of the said Territory shall always
be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus and of
the trial by jury."
The Constitution of the United States provides, Article III.,
Section I :
"The trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment shall
be by jury."
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution provide:
"That no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury."
And that in all criminal prosecutions:
"The accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime
shall have been committed."
It has been held by a long line of authorities, both before and
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the so-called
Bill of Rights contained in the first eight amendments to the Con-
stitution applied only to the Federal Government and did not limit
the power of the States.
This was due to the fact that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution it was fear of the general government and its possi-
ble encroachments upon individual liberty that caused apprehension
among the people of the States. Their desire was to establish a
government which, while having stability, would not be in any
position to encroach upon the liberties which the colonists had
learned to believe by reason of the development of English his-
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tory to be essential to their happiness and prosperity. (Barron
v. Baltimore, 7 Pet., 243.)
The States were looked upon as the guarantors of the liberty
of their own citizens and the "Bill of Rights" was not intended to
run against the action of the States.
A State could even abridge the freedom of religion.
The case of Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How., 589, (1845),
holds squarely that the first amendment as to freedom of religion
does not apply to the action of the States. Under the reasoning
of the Hurtado and Maxwell cases this would be true even since
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A statute of New Orleans, passed in pursuance of authorization
by the State legislature, forbade a performance of funeral rites
in any save one building in New Orleans. A deceased person was
brought to a Catholic Church and the ordinary funeral rites there
performed. The parish priest in charge was punished for a viola-
tion of the ordinance and the case came to the Supreme Court of
the United States on a writ of error on the ground that the ordi-
nance was in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution
as well as the Act admitting Louisiana to statehood. The answer
made by the Court was as follows:
"The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the cit-
izens of the respective States in their religious liberties; this is
left to the State constitutions and laws; nor is there any inhibition
imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect
on the States." (p. 6o9.)
This has been specifically held also in regard to the Seventh
Amendment, in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 9o .
Chief Justice Waite said:
"By art. 7 of the amendments, it is provided, that 'in suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.' This, as
has been many times decided, relates only to trials in the courts
of the United States. Edwards v. Elliot, 21 Wall. 557. The States,
so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in
their own courts in their own way. A trial by jury in suits at
common law pending in the State courts is not, therefore, a priv-
ilege or immunity of national citizenship, which the States are
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge. A State
cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of
law; but this does not necessarily imply that all trials in the State
courts affecting the property of persons must be by jury. This
requirement of the Constitution is met if the trial is had according
to' the settled course of judicial proceedings. Murray's Lessee v.
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Hoboken L. & I. Co., i8 How. 28o. Due process of law is process
due according to the law of the land. This process in the States
is regulated by the law of the State." (pp. 92-93.)
It may be well to mention incidentally the fact that the Con-
stitution of the United States and especially the Amendments
spoken of contain no language indicative of or in any way bor-
rowed from the French writers, whose theories in that time in
the domain of politics were so universally dominant. Phrases
such as those found in the Declaration of Independence, drawn by
Mr. Jefferson himself, so susceptible.to the influence of the French
philosophers, are nowhere to be found in the Constitution itself.
The origin of every one of the rights mentioned in the Bill of
Rights can be traced to some event or series of incidents in Eng-
lish history, won out finally as the result of years of
struggle.
The Constitution, therefore, deals with practical and tangible
rights and does not indulge in any philosophic generalizations.
Take, for instance, the Amendments seriatim.
The first article provides that there shall be no established re-
ligion. It is because of "an establishment of religion" in England
and the persecution of dissenters therefrom that the founders of
Massachusetts and numerous other colonies had left the mother
country. No vague theory of natural rights dominated the fram-
ers, and the fact that there were so many adherents of various de-
nominations among the American people made it impossible that
any one religion should be established and thus rendered it easy
to acquiesce in a Constitution which protected all alike.
The abridging of freedom of speech or of the press, likewise
referred to a long struggle with the English Crown, as did the
right of the people to assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances which we find contained in the Petition of
Rights and embodied in the Bill of Rights more than one hundred
years before .Rousseau.
The second article, providing for a well-regulated militia, bore
witness to the constitutional -dislike of English people for a stand-
ing army as a menace to their rights, a natural result of the long
conflict with the Stuart Kings; and the right of the people to
bear arms was a tacit tribute to the view that in case of necessity
other protection than that of a Constitution might prove a neces-
sary resort.
The prohibition in the third article against the quartering of
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soldiers in any house is traceable to the practice of the Monarchy
before 1688, rightly so unpopular in England. (Green, Eng. Peo-
ple, 501.)
The fourth article is a direct outcome of that long agitiation
which culminated in the celebrated Wilkes case, in which the
English Courts, sustaining Wilkes, held general warrants and seiz-
ures illegal. The doctrine of Entick v. Carrington and Three
King's Messengers; enunciated so boldly by Lord Camden as a
canon of English liberty, became imbedded in the Constitution
as a protection, so the framers thought, for all future time to
those under American sovereignty. (Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S., 616.)
The fifth and sixth articles, as well as the seventh, providing
for jury trials in civil cases, were considered upon a par with
the other great rights, and as those three amendments occupy
almost as much space in the eight amendments constituting the
so-called "Bill of Rights" as the others put together, it would seem
that the framers did not consider that they occupied a compara-
tively subsidary position and dealt merely with matters of procedure.
That the Supreme Court at this day takes a very different view we
will now see.
That grand and petit juries are essential in Federal Courts
in their fullest force as known to the common law, has never been
questioned. Ex parte Bain, supra. That they are neces-
sary in all our Territories, acquired previous to 1898, has also
been judicially determined.
The eighth amendment prohibiting excessive bail, excessive fines,
and cruel and unusual punishment does no more than follow the
English "Bill of Rights."
The cases of Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, and American
Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S., 464, as well as Springzdlle
v. Thomas, 166 U. S., 707, are authority for the proposition that a
territorial legislature in Utah could not abolish jury trial, that
being a right secured by the Constitution to every person against
the action of the Federal Government.
These cases have been somewhat refined away in the Insular
cases by the suggestion in Mr. Justice Brown's opinion, (Downes
v. Bidwell), that the Constitution had been enacted into Utah
Territory by legislation and hence was only there by force of statute,
thus leaving open the question of the power of Congress under the
Constitution in territory outside the States.
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Hurtado v. California, Iio U. S., 516, involved the validity of
a section of the Constitution of California, providing for prose-
cution by information in place of the common law method of
indictment in cases of infamous crime. In the Supreme Court the
prisoner claimed that under the Fourteenth Amendment he was
entitled to due process of law, and that due process of law in-
volved indictment by grand jury.
The Court held, (Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting) that due
process of law did not necessarily involve indictment by grand
jury. Mr. Justice Matthews, writing for the Court, went into
the historic evidence as to the origin of juries and came to the
conclusion that the phrase "Due Process of Law," or its equivalent
in English institutional history, "The Law of the Land," did not
include indictment in capital cases.
I cannot at the present time critically examine the ques-
tion as to how far this view is historically justified. Yet, what-
ever may have been the fact at the time Magna Charta was wrung
from King John whether in that great instrument "judgment of
his peers," (Judicium parium) meant what jury trial now does,
or whether it referred to the then Court of Exchequer, it does
appear altogether clear that, at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution, due process of law in capital cases necessarily in-
volved jury trial.
By going back to the beginnings of history, a time will be
reached when almost any one of our present institutions is found
in the mere germ and would seem, except perhaps to the antiquary,
wholly unrecognizable. Due process of law once involved maim-
ing, torturing, the ordeal by fire and water, the peine forte et dure
and the other processes which we now look upon as barbarous and
shocking, but the question which would seem to have been pre-
sented in Hurtado v. California, was what the phrase, "Due Pro-
cess of Law," meant at the time of the ratification of the Consti-
tution, or perhaps what it meant at the time of the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
It seems to us that Justice Matthews, in going back to
primitive law, is in conflict with the view propounded in Thomp-
son v. Utah, 17o U. S., 343. In the latter case jury trial was deemed
to have been essential from the time of Magna Charta, and while
this may historically be open to question, nevertheless the decis-
ion of the Court in that case was based upon the clearly correct
proposition that if was deemed fundamental at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution.
308
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It would seem that the decision in Hurtado v. California was
really due to the fact that a century of legal development had
changed American public opinion upon the subject of the jury.
This appears forcibly in the case of Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S.,
581, a recent case of the highest importance. In that case the
same question was presented as in Hurtado v. California, together
with a further one arising from the fact that the trial had been
by a jury of eight under the California constitution and law. An
argument not urged or pressed by counsel in the Hurtado case
was here advanced and fully considered by the Court.
Counsel for the prisoner claimed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment providing that no State shall abridge any of the rights, priv-
leges or immunities of a citizen of the United States, guaranteed to
every citizen jury trial. His claim was in effect that the first eight
amendments to the Contstitution constituted rights of an American
citizen which no State could abridge.
The Court held otherwise, holding that the eight amendments,
after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment had no greater
scope than before and that they were still solely directed against
the action of the Federal Government. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment not having made them applicable to the action of the States,
while it was difficult to state just what the rights and immuni-
ties of an American citizen were, jury trial, and indictment by
grand jury, were not included among them.
This was indeed a momentous decision.
The Fourteenth Amendment according to thi§ view did not
attempt to enlarge the existing rights and immunities of American
citizens, but at most merely protected existing rights and immuni-
ties against the State Governments. What were these rights and
how would they be determined? If they were not in the first eight
amendments, where did the Constitution provide for them? These
rights and immunities are not enumerated in nor conferred by any
clause of the Constitution except in so far as they may be conferred
in the clause providing:
"Art. 4, Sec. 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
It was pointed out by counsel iV the Maxwell case that the de-
bates in Congress evidenced the intention of the framers of the
amendment to confer upon the citizen of the States all the rights
contained in the eight amendments. (Guthrie, Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 22-4.)
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Had this view been adopted it would have gone far to nation-
alizing the domain of civil liberty, as was the evident intent of the
framers of the Amendment, but the fact that the Court took a
different view would seem to have rendered that portion of the
amendment virtually meaningless.
If the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States have been in no way increased by the amendment, it is hard
to see what benefit such citizens have received. The rights and
privileges which they enjoyed already under the Constitution
were protected as well before as after the 'Fourteenth Amend-
ment; unless then they were to receive some advantage from
this clause, why should it have been inserted?
Was it merely declaratory?
It certainly did not seem so to the people of the United States
at the time of its enactment. Could they have supposed it meant
so little they would scarcely have treated the matter so seriously.
Is it not the fact that the decision in those two cases was main-
ly owing to the reaction against the national and centralizing ten-
dencies of the civil war and the years immediately following? Did
not the Court feel that this portion at least of the Amendment did
not represent the real opinion of the people? Was the appeal from
the Amendment to the Court an appeal from "Philip drunk to
Philip sober," and did the view of the Court better represent the
calm afterthought of the people than that of the framers of the
Amendment itself ?
It is apparent thai the Court took a different view from that of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as to a pure question
of political science. The question was, whether civil liberty should
for its sanction depend mainly upon the State or upon the Federal
Government. What the framers of the instrument almost cer-
tainly intended to do was to withdraw the essentials of liberty,
or what they deemed such, from possible invasion by the State
Governments and to place them under the protection of the Federal
Government. The Court evidently believed that such a course
would have been unwise, if not positively revolutionary.
The reasoning in these cases is based upon the dictum of Jus-
tice Miller in the Slaughter House Cases, (16 Wall., 36).
"It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove
by citations of authority, that up to the adoption of the recent
amendments no claim or pretense was set up that those rights de-
pended on the Federal Government for their existence or protec-
tion, beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal
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Constitution imposed upon the States-such, for instance, as the
prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder and laws
impairing the obligation of contracts. But with the exception of
these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined,
lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States,
and without that of the Federal Government. Was it the purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment, by the simple declaration that no
State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to trans-
fer the security and protection of all the civil rights, which we
have mentioned, from the States to the Federal Government? And
where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to en-
force that article, was it intended to bring within the power of
Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging
exclusively to the States? * * * The argument we admit is not
always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences
urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an in-
strument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences
are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect
is to fetter and degrade the State Governments by subjecting them
to the control of Congress in the exercise of power heretofore uni-
versally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental
character; when, in fact, it radically changes the whole theory of
the relations of the State and Federal Governments to each other
and of both these Governments to the people; the argument has
a force that is irresistible in the absence of language which ex-
presses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
"We are convinced that no such results were intended by the
Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures
of the States which ratified them." (pp. 589-590.)
The Court in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, after quoting the
above says:
"The definition of the words 'privileges and immirnities,' as
given by Mr. Justice Washington, was adopted in substance in
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168, I8o, and in Ward v. Maryland, 12
Wall 418, 430. These rights, it is said in the Slaughter House
Cases, have always been held to be the class of rights which the
State Governments were created to establish." (pp. 591-592.)
Yet if they were safe in the hands of the State Governments,
why did the Fourteenth Amendment prescribe that no State should
abridge them?
This leaves the question in a most anomalous condition. The
rights referred to then would be the rights conferred by the States
generally upon their citizens. As the legislation is different in
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each State, their traditions and legal systems being in so many
cases entirely dissimilar, it would seem very difficult to define or
enumerate these rights. Should Utah enact all the tenets of the
Mormon religion into law obligatory on all, could the New Yorker
sojourning in that State complain? He could not allege that he
had been denied any privilege or immunity accorded to citizens
of Utah ?
The privilege and immunity clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as interpreted has created no new privilege or immunities. It
may, however, be claimed that what the Fourteenth Amendment
really meant to do, and this is probably what the Court intended to
announce, was to protect from the interference of the State all those
general rights which the States had all of them accorded to the
individual.
If this be the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as now
interpreted, the Court will have to determine the rights which it
considers to be fundamental, and it could only reach this result by
a process somewhat analogous to that used by the Roman lawyers
in determining what rules and institutions belonged to the jus gen-
tium. It would be necessary to discover those rights which all
the States had at all times accorded to their citizens, solely because
of their citizenship. Such rights the Court apparently intends t&
designate when it speaks of fundamental rights. Under this view
the Court is really empowered to determine what rights do and
what rights do not belong to the category of fundamental rights,
and in doing this they are exercising an extraordinary and almost
unprecedented power.
It is obvious that all rights granted by the Constitution are
protected by it. What rights not created by the Constitution are
"secured" by the Constitution it is impossible to say further than we
have already indicated.
"There is no intimation here that among the privileges or immun-
ities of a citizen of th& United States are the right of trial by jury in.
a State court for a State offense and the right to be exempt from
any trial for an infamous crime, unless upon presentment by a
grand jury." (Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S., 581, 594.)
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 4th ed., p. 497, marginal
page 387, says:
"Although the precise meaning of 'privileges and immunities'
is not very conclusively settled as yet, it appears to be conceded that
the Constitution secures in each State to the citizens of all other
States the right to remove to and carry on business therein; the
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right by the usual modes to acquire and hold property, and to pro-
tect and defend the same in the law; the right to the usual reme-
dies for the collection of debts and the enforcement of other per-
sonal rights, and the right to be exempt, in property and person,
from taxes or burdens vhich the property or persons of citizens of
the same State are not subject to."
It would seem that had the intention of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment been carried out by the Court there would
have been no such difficulty in discovering the "precise meaning
of privileges and immunities."
The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
should not be matters so difficult or "tedious" to define. The view
that this phrase included the liberties enumerated in the Bill of
Rights and that the Fourteenth Amendment intended to secure
these great historic rights against all government, both State and
National, would have left little ground for doubt or difficulty.
Such rights in addition to those already secured against State
action in the First Article of the Constitution would have made
a formidable array of rights and immunities which every Ameri-
can citizen would have been sure that he possessed, whereas under
the present interpretation of the Amendment it is impossible for
him to know exactly what his rights are.
In both the Hurtado and Maxwell cases masterly dissenting
opinions were written by Mr. Justice Harlan. These opinions are
among the best written by that learned and experienced jurist.
They make it clear that the decisions mentioned have repealed much
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus the State is as free to-day as it was when the Permoli case
was decided, to establish a religion. If the State of Utah chooses
to make Mormonism the established religion, there is nothing in
the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent it, as Mr. Jusice Harlan
bas pertinently observed. (Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S., 581.)
Recent cases make it clear that the States are as free from
trammel by the Bill of Rights to-day as they were before the
Amendment.
"The provision in reference to cruel and unusual punishments
was taken from the well-known act of Parliament of i688, enti-
tled 'An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject
and Settling the Succession of the Crown,' in which, after rehears-
ing various grounds of grievance, and among others, that 'excessive
bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to
elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects;
and excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel pun-
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ishments inflicted.' * * * Stat. I W. & M. c. 2. This Declaration of
Rights had reference to the acts of the executive and judicial de-
partments of the government of England; but the language in
question as used in the constitution of the State of New York
was intended particularly to operate upon the legislature of the
State, to whose control the punishment of crime was almost wholly
confided. So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offense
against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual,
as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the
like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties
to be within the constitutional prohibition. And we think this
equally true of the Eighth Amendment, in its application to Con-
gress." (In re Kemler, 136 U. S., 436, at pp. 446, 447.)
The Court held in this case upon the authority of the United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; the Slaughter House Cases,
16 Wall. 36, and Hurtado v. California, Iio U. S. 516, that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not affect the case nor make the eighth
section of the Bill of Rights applicable to State action. The Court,
through-Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, there said:
"Undoubtedly the amendment forbids any arbitrary deprivation
of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under
like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; and, in the
administration of criminal justice, requires that no different or
higher punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed
upon all for like offences. But it was not designed to interfere with
the power of the State to protect the lives, liberties and property
of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace, morals, education
and good order." Barbierv. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27, 31, pp. 448-9.
In the case of Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S., 252, the question
was as to the applicability of the Second Amendment of the Con-
stitution to a State law providing that none but members of the
State militia should be allowed to bear arms, etc. The Court
there said:
"But a conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment
prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the amend-
ment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the Na-
tional Government, and not upon that of the States. * * * The
Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this,
as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed
by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other
effect than to restrict the powers of the National Government, leav-
ing the people to look for their protection against any violation by
their fellow citizens of the rights it recognizes to what is called in
The City of New York v. Miln, ii Pet. (io2) 139, the 'powers
which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was perhaps
more properly called internal police,' 'not surrendered or restrained'
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by the Constitution of the United States. See also Barron z. Balti-
more, 7 Pet. 243; Fox v. The State of Ohio, 5 How. 410; Twitchelt
v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321, 327; Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cowen,
81g; Commonwealth v. Purchase, 2 Pick. 521; United States v.
Cruikshank, i Woods, 308; North Carolina v. Newsom, 5 Iredell,
250; Andrews v. State, 3 Heiskell, 165; Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455."
(p. 265.)
How is it to be determined what rights are fundamental and
what are not if the Constitution has 'not determined it? They
must be questions to be determined by the Court, and this substi-
tutes the judgment of the Court in each particular case, for the
precise and clear language of the Constitution.
It seems to us that there is no escape from this inference; it is
the only theory upon which the decision in Maxwell v. Dow can
be explained.
This was clearly the view that Mr. Justice Harlan took of the
prevailing opinion, for he says:
"When our more immediate ancestors removed to America, they
brought this privilege with them, as their birthright and inher-
itance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced
round and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches
of arbitrary power. It is now incorporated into all our State
constitutions as a fundamental right, and the Constitution of the
United States would have been justly obnoxious to the most con-
clusive objection if it had not recognized and confirmed it in the
most solemn terms." (p. 61o.)
The scope of the decision and its far reaching effect was dearly
seen by Mr. Justice Harlan:
"Suppose the State of Utah should amend its constitution and
make the Mormon religion the established religion of the State,
to be supported by taxation on all the people of Utah. Could its
right to do so, as far as the Constitution of the United States is
concerned, be gainsayed under the principles of the opinion just
delivered? If such an amendment were alleged to be invalid under
the National Constitution, could not the opinion herein be cited as
showing that the right to the free exercise of religion was not a
privilege of a 'citizen of the United States' within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment? * * * There is no middle posi-
tion, unless it be assumed to be one of the functions of the judiciary
by an interpretation of the Constitution to mitigate or defeat what
its members may deem the erroneous or unwise action of the peo-
ple in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * The right
to be tried when charged with crime, by a jury of twelve persons,
is placed by the Constitution upon the same basis as the other
rights specified in the first ten amendments. And while those
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amendments originally limited only the powers of the National Gov-
ernment in respect of the privileges and immunities specified there-
in, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment those privi-
leges and immunities are, in my opinion, also guarded against in-
fringement by the States. * * *
"If some of the guarantees of life, liberty and property, which
at the time of the adoption of the National Constitution were re-
garded as fundamental and as absolutely essential to the enjoyment
of freedom, have, in the judgment of some, ceased to be of prac-
tical value, it is for the people of the United States so to declare
by an amendment of that instrument. But, if I do not wholly mis-
apprehend the scope and legal effect of the present decision, the
Constitution of the United States does not stand in the way of
any State striking down guarantees of life and liberty- that English
speaking people have for centuries regarded as vital to personal
security, and which the men of the Revolutionary period universally
claimed as the birthright of freedom." (pp. 616-617.)
This reasoning seems to be quite unanswerable. It emphasizes
the fact that under that fiction of interpretation the Court has actually
changed the Constitution.
In the Hurtado and Maxwell cases the Court had already in-
dicated a belief that there were certain fundamental rights belonging
to United States citizens, which rights were not necessarily
contained among the rights guaranteed to the individual by the
Constitution.
The Court in the Insular Cases clearly expressed the existence
of this distinction, based upon the nature of right itself. The
decision there did not turn on the question, so that the expression
quoted is a dictum.
Mr. justice Brown, (Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244), uses
the following significant language:
"There are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the
Anglo-Saxon character which need no expression in constitutions
or statutes to give them effect or to secure dependencies against
legislation manifestly hostile to their real interests." (p. 280.)
"We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a
distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the Con-
stitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and what
may be termed artificial or remedial rights, which are peculiar to our
own system of jurisprudence. Of the former class are the rights
to one's own religious opinions and to a public expression of them or,
as sometimes said, to worship God according to the dictates of
one's own conscience; the right to personal liberty and individual
property; to freedom of speech and of the press; to free access to
courts of justice, to due process of law and to equal protection of
the laws; to immunities from unreasonable searches and seizures,
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as well as cruel and unusual punishments; and to such other im-
munities as are indispensable to a free government. Of the latter
class are the rights to citizenship, to suffrage (Minor v. Happersett,
21 Wall. 162), and to the particular methods of procedure pointed
out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence, and some of which have already been held by the States
to be unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals." (pp.
282, 283.)
Before commenting upon this passage as a whole, it may be
-remarked that the particular methods of procedure which have
been held unnecessary to the proper protection of the individuals,
are not the only rights secured against the federal government but
not against the States.
All of the rights -which Mr. Justice Brown has spoken of as
"natural rights," the Court, as we have shown, hold the States
may under the Constitution disregard, and their reasoning has
not been based upon the distinction in the nature of the rights
themselves, although incidental -remarks may be found to that effect.
This passage when analyzed must be based upon one of two
alternative theories:
(i) Either the natural rights spoken of by the learned Justice
exist of themselves and wholly apart from the Constitution, deriving
their sanction from a supposed law of nature and not from that
instrument.
(2) Or the language of the Constitution itself protecting those
rights is so broad and imperative as to be of universal application
to government action in the specific cases.
If the former be the proper interpretation of this interesting
passage, the questions which would arise in regard to it would not
present problems of constitutional law at all, but questions of
abstract philosophy. If there are certain rights which are protected
because they are assumed to belong to the category of "natural
rights," the question in each case would be as to whether such rights
were "natural" or not. If they were they would be protected be-
cause of their inherent character, and if they were not, they would
either have to rely upon positive man-made law for their sanction,
or else be unprotected by any law.
In order, therefore, to ascertain what rights were natural and,
therefore, entitled to immunity from attack by all organs of the
government, we would have to refer not to the law books, which deal
only with positive law, but to treatises on philosophy from Aris-
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totles' Politics (250 B. C.) down to Ritchie's "Natural Rights"
(189o A. D.), with especial reference to Rousseau.
As almost every writer upon the subject has differed as to what
natural rights are, following in his views, the general
ideals of the particular time in which he haipened to live, we
must respectfully submit that any appeal to natural rights at this
day must prove utterly futile.
Nor do we at all believe that the learned justice meant that
certain rights were to be protected independently of constitutional
and positive law simply because they were "natural." We incline
to think the true meaning of the passage to be that the positive
prohibitions against all action upon the part of Congress in certain
cases were intended for the protection of what were deemed natural
rights, and that consequently some at least of that vague body of
philosophic doctrine has been transplanted into the domain of positive
law and given the dignity of constitutional adoption by being placed
in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. Therefore, we
submit, Mr. Justice Brown must refer to the same rights which he
mentions in the following passage:
"To sustain the judgment in the case under consideration, it by
no means becomes necessary to show that none of the articles of
the Constitution apply to the island of Porto Rico. There is a
clear distinction between such prohibitions as go to the very root
of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place,
and such as are operative only throughout the United States or
among the several States." (Downes Case, pp. 276-277.)
This seems likewise to be the thought of Mr. Justice White in
the same case, for he says in the following passage:
"Undoubtedly there are general prohibitions in the Constitution
in favor of the liberty and property of the citizen which are not
mere regulations as to the form and manner in which a conceded
power may be exercised, but which are an absolute denial of all
authority under any circumstances or conditions to do particular
acts.' (Downes Case., 182 U. S., p. 294.)
The distinction suggested is founded not upon a difference
in the nature of the rights themselves, that is to say, as to
whether they are natural or artificial, but upon the language of the
prohibitions directed against the action of Congress.
This being established, let us examine this distinction with a
view of ascertaining its soundness, and whether any line of de-
marcation can be drawn between the absolute withdrawals of power
from Congress and "the form and manner in which a conceded
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power may be exercised." If such a distinction be sound it would
be possible to relegate the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments
to an inferior category.
Mr. Justice Brown speaks of the right to due process of law
and to immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well
as from cruel and unusual punishments, coupling them with freedom
of conscience, freedom of the press, etc., as "natural rights." Con-
gress has the power to take property, to institute searches, to make
seizures and to execute punishments. It is evident, therefore, that in
no one of these instances does the prohibition go to the root of the
power of Congress to perform the acts in question. It may authorize
all these things, but when the government takes property it must do
so by due process of law; when it institutes searches, they must be
reasonable (that is to say, according to the canons of the common
law), and when it visits punishments, they must be neither cruel
nor unusual, as those words are understood in the light of English
and American common law and civilization.
It thus appears that in the seven illustrations given by the
learned Justice of rights with which Congress may in no event
interfere, three are protected by the prohibitions which do not "go
to the root of the power of Congress" at all. Nor is it possible to
claim that the instances mentioned belong to the shadowy domain of
natural or fundamental rights rather than to the more strictly
defined and easily ascertainable category of common law rights.
The Fifth Amendment contains a number of prohibitions
directed against the action of Congress, all of which are admittedly
based upon so-called common law rights rather than upon more
general rights or rights not so wholly identified with- the develop-
ment and history of the English law.
If, therefore, for either of the reasons suggested there exist a
distinction in the Constitution between the prohibitions in favor of
natural rights and those in favor of artificial rights, consistency
necessarily dictates that all these rights be placed in the same cate-
gory. Taking, therefore, these rights seriatim it must be admitted
that if the language:
i. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of the grand
jury,"
is not always binding on Congress, then it must also be admitted that
Congress can also disregard the prohibitions.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
2. "Any person (in such territory may) be subject for the same
offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,"
or may be
3. "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself,"
or may
4. "be deprived of life, liberty or property udthout due process
of law,"
and private property may be
5. "taken for public use without just compensation."
The Sixth Amendment, like the Fifth, is devoted to consecrating
the peculiar forms and procedure long deemed necessary to the
maintenance of English liberty, and if jury trial belongs to the
category of the artificial or remedial rights these rights likewise
belong to the same category, and the court must admit that Congress
without violation of the Constitution, might deprive persons in
criminal prosecutions from enjoying
(i) "the right to a speedy and public trial";
(2) "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
(3) to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
(4) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor,
(5) and to have assistance of counsel for his defense."
Not one of these rights was protected against the action of the
government in the Roman law countries at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, and they are clearly common law rights in
their genesis and development. They were totally opposed to the
inquisitorial system of the civil law. They are thus exactly in the
same category with the right to be tried only upon presentment
by a grand jury and to be convicted only upon a unanimous .verdict
of a petit jury. No refinement of philosophy can segregate the
rights contained in these two amendments into different classes.
If in the lapse of time some of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may be deemed of less importance than formerly, it
may be that the people should be called upon in the regular constitu-
tional way to amend that instrument. The framers believed jury
trial to be an essential element of liberty. Probably many of our
people no longer take that view. Should the change in public
sentiment, if such there be, be sufficient reason to induce this Court
to make a decision which will, for the first time, be authority for
the proposition that law courts, acting under United States authority,
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may in our own domestic territory, without acting "contrary to the
Constitution," violate every right which English speaking men have
considered vital since the barons humbled King John at Runny-
meade?
This language of Mr. Justice Brown as to natural rights was
used as a foundation upon which to decide the Mankichi Case, 19o U.
S. 197, and that which was a mere dictum in the Downes case has
now become part of our constitutional law by reason of that decision.
In the Mankichi case, Congress in annexing Hawaii, declared
that:
"The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted
for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not incon-
sistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution
of the United States, nor to any existing treaty of the United States,
shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall
otherwise determine." (i9o U. S., p. 209.)
Under the law as it stood at the time of the annexation of the
Hawaiian Islands, criminal prosecutions were carried on by in-
formations and trials before a jury which could convict by a three-
fourths vote. The defendant, Mankichi, was so tried and con-
victed of manslaughter. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus,
which was sustained, and the Attorney-General of the islands took
an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The case did not involve the question argued in the Insular
cases as to whether the Constitution was of itself applicable to
the outlying possessions of the United States. The sole question
was as to whether, when Congress enacted that only laws not "con-
trary to the Constitution" should be in force in Hawaii, the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments did not become as applicable there as elsewhere
throughout the United States. These very amendments had been
held applicable to criminal prosecutions in the other territories of the
United States. (American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464;
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, and other cases.) It was urged
that unless they were, this phrase of the Act of Congress was abso-
lutely meaningless, and had the laws of Hawaii established religious
tests for the holding of office, burning as a customary punishment,
and general search warrants as a pirt of their procedure, such would
not have been any more obnoxious to the constitutional objection than
denial of jury trial as prescribed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The government, on the other hand, relying upon the dictum
of Mr. Justice Brown, above adverted to, refused to assent to this
conclusion, but claimed that there was a certain line of cleavage
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between the various prohibitions contained in the Bill of Rights in
that some of the rights were fundamental or natural, while others
only related to methods of procedure and hence could be dispensed
with by the government.
The question was thus squarely presented to the Court as to
whether it had power to distinguish between equally positive prohibi-
tions in the Constitution on the ground that some belonged to the
domain of natural rights, while others did not. This would make the
criterion of the rights of citizens or other persons in the United
States dependent upon the Court's view as to what constituted natural
rights rather than upon the positive mandate of the Constitution.
In principle this view was irreconcilable with the decision in
Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. i.
The Court answers the question, first, by saying that a literal
interpretation of the statute would make applicable to existing
Hawaiian law the prohibitions contained in the two Amendments
mentioned, but that no such literal interpretation should be given
the statute, as it should be assumed that Congress did not mean to
disturb the existing criminal legislation in the islands. Therefore,
the trial as held, was decided not to have controvened the Con-
stitution, but the Court said, in answer to the argument of counsel,
that their decision in favor of the government would necessarily
be to render the words "contrary to the Constitution" mere empty
verbiage:
"It is not intended here to decide that the words 'nor contrary
to the Constitution of the United States' are meaningless. Clearly
they would be operative upon any municipal legislation thereafter
adopted, and upon any proceedings thereafter had, when the appli-
cation of the Constitution would not result in the destruction of
existing provisions conducive to the peace and good order of the
community. Therefore we should answer without hesitation in the
negative the question put by counsel for the petitioner in their brief:
'Would municipal statutes of Hawaii, allowing a conviction of
treason on circumstantial evidence, or on the testimony of one
witness, depriving a person of liberty by the will of the legislature
and without process, or confiscating private property for public
use without compensation, remain in force after an annexation of
the Territory of the United States, which was conditioned upon the
extinction of all legislation contrary to the Constitution?' We would
even go farther and say that most, if not all, the privileges and
immunities contained in the bill of rights of the Constitution were
intended to apply from the moment of annexation; but we- place our
decision of this case upon the ground that the two rights alleged to
be violated in this case are not fundamental in their nature, but
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concern merely a method of procedure which sixty years of practice
had shown to be suited to the conditions of the islands, and well
calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their
property and their well-being."
This, then, is the last step in the evolution of the decisions of
our highest tribunal on this point as to jury trial. It serves to
illustrate the fact that the Court, in interpreting the Constitution,
may, and does, positively amend or change it. Other examples
of this process might indeed be given, but we doubt if there are
any which stand out so unequivocally as the one we have just been
considering.
What we have said has not been intended in any way as criticism,
or as the slightest reflection upon the judicial knowledge, acumen
and intellectual integrity of that great tribunal. In deciding as they
have done it may well be that they have acted wisely and for the
best interests of the nation. It is, however, necessary that we
lawyers should appreciate exactly what is taking place in the domain
of constitutional law; by comprehending the nature of the process
and its results we are in a position to criticise intelligently at least,
and criticism where lawyers are concerned is a law of life.
It is usual in closing a discourse of this kind to indulge in some
attempt at peroration, parading a few glittering phrases and pompous
truisms, perhaps stimulating the feelings, serious or otherwise, of
one's auditors. I fear that I have neither the ability nor the in-
clination to do this, but must content myself with trying to sum up
in a word the idea, if it be worthy of that name, that I have been
striving to propound and illustrate.
It is briefly this: As a people we have shown political ability
and sagacity of a high order. Man is naturally a political animal,
although he is many other things besides, and the English speaking
political animal seems to have been the most practical so far seen.
While others have certainly surpassed him in different departments
of human activity, such as art, literature and philosophy, they have
rarely or never been able to combine in the same degree stability and
progress in matters of government.
The fact that we have a written Constitution is an accident of
our history. But we have developed and changed it no less radically
and, perhaps, more so than the English have done their unwritten
customary Constitution. This result has been reached wholly
through the medium of judicial decision, save in the case of the
three amendments following our civil war and designed to per-
petuate its results.
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But these judge-made changes have usually been in accord
with and due to the spirit of the age; the Court really doing little
more than registering the modifications of the national common
consciousness. Hence, these changes in most cases have passed
unnoticed.
Where, however, the Supreme Court has endeavored to counter-
act, if not absolutely to stem a great current of public feeling, as
it did in the Dred Scott case, the decision has only deepened and
invenomed the conflict which it tried and hoped to avert. When
Mr. Buchanan announced that the expected decision of the Court
in that famous case would solve the slavery question forever, he
did not appreciate the fact that the prestige and power of the Court
as of all other branches of the government, must ultimately rest
upon its harmony with the general settled trend of public opinion.
The respect heretofore shown by our people for the Constitution,
and the almost veneration with which they have regarded it, is in
itself a sentiment that must be fostered and preserved, as the utility
of the Constitution and its endurance must depend upon the existence
of such a feeling. Destroy that conservative sentiment and the
Constitution itself would be of little value.
The Constitutions of South American republics are no guaranty
of stability, not because of any defect in language or symmetry, but
because the institutions they attempt to create do not command the
reverence and respect of the nation. A Constitution, like a suit of
clothes, must be made with some reference to the wearer. If he
live under the tropical sun his apparel, constitutional and otherwise,
must not be over elaborate.
It seems to me that the danger in America in our day comes more
largely from the constantly growing and all invading activity of
government than from any other source. While the Supreme Court
cannot, of course, remain oblivious of or be uninfluenced by this
tremendous drift of opinion, it should be careful not to hasten it
or go in advance of it. Timely restraint may cause the reconsider-
ation of various half-understood policies and keep our government
in the line of evolution rather than in that of revolution.
Some of our old institutions may have become obsolete, but they
cost many years of effort and much shedding of blood to attain,
and they should not be surrendered without careful reflection. If
the constitutional method of amendment is too difficult the extra-
constitutional method, useful though it has been and will still be,
must not become too easy. If it does the foundation of our govern-
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ment,-respect for our constitution-will be sapped. It is said, and
perhaps truly, that past generations should not control the actions
of the present. But before we definitely conclude that our wisdom
is so much greater than that of our forefathers, let us be quite sure
that we are right. Above all, let not the Bar delude itself with
fictions and official theories which only "blink the facts." Fearless
analysis, not lazy acquiescence or unreasoning vituperation, were
never more needed and seldom less practiced. The Bar cannot act
intelligently unless it first thinks clearly.
Frederic R. Coudert, Ph.D.
